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On 8 August 1914, less than three weeks after the outbreak of war between 
Russia and Germany, representatives from forty-four Russian cities met 
in Moscow to discuss the contribution they could make to the war effort. 
Viktor Brianskii, the Moscow mayor, opened the meeting with a rousing 
speech. He declared that:
Russia is living through a moment of great historical significance, 
requiring the full exercise of all our strength. A centuries-old quarrel is 
being resolved, the question of the superiority of the Slavs or the Teutons, 
and this issue must be settled once and for all. There cannot, and should 
not, be any half-hearted resolution of this question. […] Victory must be 
total and the Slavs must be victorious, since only they are able to bring 
Europe permanent and durable peace.1
These representatives of Russia’s local government organizations greeted 
the war with enthusiasm, cheering when the text of a telegram to Nicholas 
II was read out and they, together with their colleagues in the zemstva, 
took rapid steps to contribute to the Russian war effort. This article will 
discuss the role of these public organizations during the first months of 
the war.2 
Peter Waldron is Professor of Modern History at the University of East Anglia.
 I am very grateful to the Wellcome Trust for its generous financial support during the 
preparation of this article.
1  S˝ezd gorodskikh golov v Moskve 8–9 avgusta 1914 goda. Stenograficheskii otchet, 
Moscow, 1914, p. 2.
2  The wartime role of public organizations has been discussed in Tikhon J. Polner, 
Russian Local Government during the War and the Union of Zemstvos, New Haven CT, 1930, 
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 Patriotic enthusiasm for war was evident from its first days.3 On 20 
July, the Emperor performed the ceremonial duties that marked Russia’s 
entry into the war against Germany. Sitting in the Malachite Room 
of the Winter Palace in St Petersburg, he signed the formal manifesto 
announcing the Russian declaration of war and followed this with a speech 
to the assembled dignitaries of the empire in the palace’s Nicholas Hall. ‘I 
solemnly affirm’, the tsar asserted, ‘ that I shall not conclude peace while 
a single enemy soldier remains on our soil’. Nicholas then appeared on the 
Winter Palace’s central balcony, overlooking Palace Square, where great 
crowds had gathered carrying the Russian flag and large portraits of the 
emperor.4 Support for the war was very plain when the Duma and State 
Council gathered on 26 July in the Winter Palace to be addressed by the 
tsar. Nicholas emphasized the national unity that had been demonstrated 
in the first days of the war, declaring that ‘the enormous surge of 
patriotic feelings of love and devotion to the throne which has spread 
like a hurricane across our whole land, shows […] that our great Mother 
Russia will bring this […] war to its desired conclusion’.5 The purpose of 
the joint sitting of the legislative chambers was to vote credits to provide 
the government with the financial resources to wage war and none of the 
political parties represented in the Duma was prepared to vote against this 
measure. Even the Bolsheviks, the most severe of the government’s critics 
in the Duma, decided to abstain rather than run counter to the prevailing 
public mood by directly opposing finance for the war. Representatives of 
other political parties made speeches in which they gave extravagant praise 
to the national unity that the war had engendered. Rodzianko, the Duma 
chairman, contended that ‘our enemies believed that we were divided by 
and Paul P. Gronsky and Nicholas J. Astrov, The War and the Russian Government, New 
Haven CT, 1929, pp. 131–311. More recent studies include Mark George, ‘Liberal Opposition 
in Wartime Russia: A Case Study of the Town and Zemstvo Unions, 1914–1917’, Slavonic 
and East European Review, 65, 1987, 3, pp. 371–90; V. M. Shevyrin, Vlast´ i obshchestvennye 
organizatsii v Rossii (1914–1917), Moscow, 2003, and A. S. Tumanova, Obshchestvennye 
organisatsii Rossii v gody Pervoi mirovoi voiny (1914–fevral´ 1917 g.), Moscow, 2014.
3  Hubertus F. Jahn, Patriotic Culture in Russia during World War I, Ithaca, NY, 1996, 
pp. 171–73; I. S. Rozental ,´ ‘Obrazovannoe obshchestvo i narod’, in Iu. A. Petrov (ed.), 
Rossiia v gody Pervoi mirovoi vony: ekonomicheskoe polozhenie, sotsial´nye protsessy, 
politicheskii krizis, Moscow, 2014, pp. 399–413 (pp. 403–04). A more differentiated view 
is presented in Josh Sanborn, ‘The Mobilization of 1914 and the Question of the Russian 
Nation: A Reexamination’, Slavic Review, 59, 2000, 2, pp. 267–89.
4  B. Kolonitskii, ‘Tragicheskaia erotika’: Obrazy imperatorskoi sem´i v gody Pervoi 
mirovoi voiny, Moscow, 2010, pp. 73–77.
5  Gosudarstvennaia Duma, Stenograficheskie otchety, sozyv IV, sessia 2, 26 July 1914, p. 
2.
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dissension and hostility, whereas all the peoples populating the immense 
Russian lands have united in one fraternal family once society has been 
threatened by calamity’. Alexander Kerenskii, a member of the Trudovik 
party, was applauded from all sides of the Duma when he declared that 
‘the great power of Russian democracy, alongside all its other strengths, 
will deliver a decisive rebuff to the enemy’ and deputies from the Baltic 
provinces of the empire — heavily populated by Baltic Germans — assured 
the Duma that their loyalty to the Russian cause was absolute.6 
 The government took other steps to try to capitalize on the patriotism 
that the outbreak of war had stimulated. On 19 August, an imperial decree 
announced that St Petersburg, the imperial capital, was to be renamed 
Petrograd, a more Russian appellation than its original German-sounding 
name. The censorship regime imposed at the start of the war meant that 
there was no discussion of the decision in the Russian press, but there were 
some indications that the new name was not universally popular, especially 
since the renaming coincided with the first reports of Russian military 
defeat by the Germans in East Prussia. Baron Nikolai Wrangel ,´ a noted art 
critic, wrote in his diary for 19 August that 
the dreadful rumours have been confirmed and today’s official 
communiqué talks about serious reverses. Today’s imperial order about 
the renaming of St Petersburg as Petrograd is especially tactless. This is a 
senseless decision that, above all, clouds the memory of the great man who 
transformed Russia, but the publication today of the renaming as ‘revenge’ 
on the Germans, on the day of our defeat, is extremely inappropriate. […] 
The whole city is deeply disturbed and indignant at this tactless trick.7 
The decision to rename the city was reported to a meeting of the city Duma 
on 25 August and the Duma members merely noted the change, with no 
applause following the announcement of the tsar’s decision.8
 The change to the name of the imperial capital possessed great symbolic 
significance, but a further measure designed to capitalize on the patriotic 
commitment to war affected Russian society much more directly. On 22 
August the tsar issued a decree prohibiting the sale of vodka for the duration 
of the war. The motivation for imposing prohibition was complex, with 
some contemporaries viewing it as representing a second emancipation, 
this time from the slavery of the Ministry of Finance’s alcohol monopoly 
6  Gosudarstvennaia Duma, Stenograficheskie otchety, 26 July 1914, pp. 11, 29, 31.
7  N. N. Vrangel ,´ Dni skorbi. Dnevnik 1914–1915 godov, St Petersburg, 2001, p. 44.
8  Izvestiia S.-Peterburgskogo gorodskoi dumy, 1914, vol. 196, no. 49, p. 1331.
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over the people of the empire. V. A. Kaigorodov, a member of the Minsk 
provincial zemstvo, wrote that ‘in 1914 Alexander II’s mighty grandson has 
through his grand designs freed the people’s soul from the torments of the 
green serpent’.9 Temperance was regarded as a means both to promote the 
effectiveness of Russia’s fighting forces, and to ensure that the home front 
stood firm in its contribution to the war effort. The impact of prohibition 
on the government’s finances was secondary, with the Council of Ministers 
at its meeting on 9 August merely instructing the Minister of Finance to 
report on the consequences for the treasury of a prolonged ban on the sale 
of spirits.10 Instead, the government was concerned about the potential 
for drunkenness among Russia’s troops, especially during the initial 
period of mobilization and among the reserves. Prohibition was a means 
of strengthening the fighting capacity of Russia’s army.11 The apparent 
widespread popular enthusiasm for the war — at least among the urban 
population — that the government wanted to encourage found expression 
in the production of large numbers of patriotic cartoons and postcards that 
supported the Russian war effort, lauding the prowess of Russia’s armies 
and displaying confidence in the outcome of the war.12
 Russia’s local government institutions very quickly showed their 
enthusiasm to contribute to the war effort. As international tensions 
sharpened during July 1914, the Moscow city duma wrote to other Russian 
city dumas suggesting that preparations should be made in case war broke 
out. The duma identified that rapid medical help for Russia’s soldiers 
was likely to be a central priority, both on the battlefield and in Moscow 
itself, and it assigned a credit of one million rubles for this, at the same 
time as opening a fund for donations from other cities.13 The outbreak of 
war on 19 July stimulated Russian local government to vigorous activity. 
Brianksii, the Moscow mayor, convened a meeting of the Moscow city 
board and representatives of public organizations in the city on 28 July 
9  Artur Mak-Ki, ‘Sukhoi zakon v gody pervoi mirovoi voiny: prichiny, kontseptsiia 
i posledstviia vvedeniia sukhogo zakona v Rossii. 1914–1917 gg.’, in Rossiia i pervaia 
mirovaia voina (Materialy mezhdunarodnogo kollokviuma), St Petersburg, 1999, pp. 147–59 
(p. 147).
10  ‘Osobyi zhurnal soveta ministrov, 9 avgusta 1914 goda’, Osobye zhurnaly Soveta 
ministrov Rossiiskoi imperii. 1914 god., Moscow, 2006, p. 271.
11  V. B. Aksenov, ‘“Sukhoi zakon” 1914 goda: ot pridvornoi intrigii do revoliutsii’, 
Rossiiskaia istoriia, 2011, no. 4, pp. 126–39 (pp. 129–32); David Christian, ‘Prohibition in 
Russia 1914–1925’, Australian Slavonic and East European Studies, 9, 1995, pp. 89–108 (pp. 
91–93).
12  Jahn, Patriotic Culture, pp. 31–50.
13  Moscow, Tsentral n´yi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Moskvy (TsGAM), f. 179, op. 60, d. 
791, ll. 1–2.
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to bring some unity to the work of providing for military casualties. 
Brianskii noted that Moscow’s organizations were disunited: the city 
duma board only had formal links with the Moscow provincial zemstvo 
and had little knowledge of Moscow’s overall readiness to provide help for 
casualties.14 Two days later, on 30 July, a meeting took place in Moscow 
of representatives from thirty five provincial zemstva to discuss the 
organization of assistance to wounded soldiers. A further six zemstva were 
unable to send representatives but conveyed their support, and the meeting 
was also attended by Nikolai Guchkov, the former mayor of Moscow who 
now chaired the Moscow municipal social welfare board and the Moscow 
branch of the Red Cross, and Georgii L´ vov, the chairman of the zemstvo 
organization for the provision of charitable assistance and a prominent 
figure in Russian political circles. Only the notoriously conservative Kursk 
zemstvo refused to offer support to the gathering, while the war ministry 
prohibited representatives of the Don region from taking part. The 
meeting heard reports from Alexander Samarin, the head of the Russian 
national Red Cross organization and M. V. Kochergin, the military official 
responsible for the evacuation of wounded soldiers from the front line. 
Discussion centred on the establishment of a new national organization 
to provide assistance to the wounded and the meeting elected L´ vov as its 
head.15 This marked the formal foundation of the All-Russian Zemstvo 
Union. Its function was set out in the second part of its title: it was intended 
to provide ‘assistance to wounded and sick soldiers’.
 The following day representatives from zemstvo and municipal 
organizations in the Moscow military evacuation district met in Moscow 
and noted the huge difficulties that confronted local government 
organizations in providing help to organize the transport of the wounded 
from the battlefield and to provide medical help once they had been 
evacuated. Existing provision for medical care in the Russian empire 
was very confused and there was no single central ministerial body that 
oversaw health matters. Responsibility for health was divided between 
the Ministries of Internal Affairs and War, while charitable organizations 
as well as the zemstva themselves also playing a part in providing 
medical services.16 During the 1880s, the prominent doctor Sergei Botkin 
orchestrated pressure to bring national healthcare provision under a 
14  Moscow, Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Voenno-istoricheskii Arkhiv (RGVIA), f. 12593, 
d. 1, l. 83.
15  RGVIA, f. 12564, op. 1, d. 3, ll. 1–5.
16  John F. Hutchinson, Politics and Public Health in Revolutionary Russia, 1890–1918, 
Baltimore, MD, 1990, pp. 4–5.
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single body, but inter-ministerial rivalry meant that the project came to 
nothing. Instead, the zemstvo themselves played a more substantial role 
in the provision of healthcare.17 The sheer scale of the task that faced the 
zemstva and city councils in 1914 was, however, entirely novel for them 
and very different from both their previous work providing healthcare and 
the experience of the war with Japan a decade earlier. It was immensely 
complex and made all the more difficult by the impossibility of predicting 
the precise circumstances in which the war would develop and the potential 
numbers of wounded. The meeting heard a report from Kochergin about 
the planning that had been undertaken for dealing with casualties, 
and the representatives agreed that they needed to unite their efforts to 
provide proper help.18 The rush of meetings continued on 3 August when a 
preparatory committee for the new national organization of Russian cities 
gathered in Moscow. The work to set up a body to bring together Russia’s 
cities ran parallel to the efforts to establish a national zemstvo organization 
and the preparatory committee agreed to invite the whole committee of the 
nascent zemstvo union to its first formal congress.19 
 The Moscow-based initiative to promote unity among local government 
institutions was supported by most of Russia’s provincial zemstva and city 
dumas. Telegrams arrived in Moscow from other cities in the first days 
of August: the Arkhangel s´k duma regretted that it could not attend the 
Moscow meeting on 3 August, but reported that it had opened a fifteen-bed 
hospital to take casualties, while Kazan´  and Vladikavkaz both expressed 
their support for the new organization. The Ufa city duma held a special 
meeting on 3 August at which it resolved to take part in the national city 
union, allocating 15,000 rubles for the purpose, and requesting that the 
new organization raise the issue of prohibiting the sale of all alcoholic 
drink during the war. Not every city, however, was as enthusiastic: both 
the Batum and Vil n´a dumas reported that they were unable to discuss the 
invitation to establish a new national organization due to the circumstances 
of war and the imposition of martial law.20 
 The Union of Towns came into formal existence at a meeting in Moscow 
17  Samuel C. Ramer, ‘The Zemstvo and Public Health’, in Terence Emmons and Wayne 
S. Vucinich, (eds), The Zemstvo: An Experiment in Local Self-Government, New York, 1982, 
pp. 279–314.
18  TsGAM, f. 179, op. 60, d. 791, ll. 34–42, Zhurnal predstavilelei gorodov i zemstv, 
prinadlezhashchikh k Moskovskomu Evakuatsionnomu okrugu, po voprosam pomoshchi 
bol´nym i ranenym voinam, iulia 31 dnia 1914 goda.
19  TSGAM, f. 179, op. 60, d. 791, ll. 72–73, Zhurnal predvaritel´nogo komiteta po 
organizatsii obshche-gorodskogo vserossiiskogo s”ezda.
20  TsGAM, f. 179, op. 60, d. 791, ll. 53–59, 70.
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on 8 and 9 August. Brianskii’s speech set the tone for the gathering, but he 
did not shy away from recognizing the very difficult consequences that war 
presented. Brianskii noted that, with millions of men on the battlefield, 
there would be hundreds of thousands of casualties. Russia must be ready to 
deal with such large numbers of wounded and there must be unity among 
the organizations that provided assistance to casualties. He reminded 
his audience that during the Russo-Japanese war a decade earlier, the 
zemstva had recognized the importance of working together as a united 
organization. Now, declared Brianksii, it was the turn of Russia’s cities to 
unite and play their part.21 Official permission for the establishment of both 
unions was given by the Ministry of Internal Affairs on 12 and 16 August, 
but this was a formality: on 6 August L´ vov had met Nicholas II while the 
tsar was visiting Moscow. Nicholas welcomed the work of the zemstva, and 
asked L´ vov to pass on his good wishes for the success of zemstvo work 
with the wounded.22 The following day the emperor and empress, together 
with their daughters, visited zemstvo warehouses on Novinskii boulevard, 
giving a clear sign that the work of local government in support of the war 
had the stamp of approval from the highest authorities in the empire.23 The 
imperial family’s immediate approbation of the way in which the zemstva 
and city dumas were uniting in support of the war effort gave the new 
unions very considerable authority throughout the course of the war: even 
when the government’s enthusiasm for the unions diminished during 1915 
and 1916, they were able to point to the personal approval of the sovereign 
for their work.24 
 The way in which the two unions were able to establish themselves 
so quickly and easily was all the more surprising, given the Russian 
government’s traditional extreme reluctance to countenance any form 
of organization that brought together the empire’s institutions of local 
government. Ever since zemstva and city dumas had been introduced in 
the 1860s and 1870s during the reign of Alexander II, the St Petersburg 
government had thwarted almost every attempt by the local government 
institutions themselves to formulate some type of over-arching organization 
that united the various provincial, district and municipal bodies. It had 
21  S˝ezd gorodskikh golov, pp. 3–4.
22  RGVIA, f. 12564, op.1 , d. 3, l. 19.
23  Vserossiiskii zemskii soiuz pomoshchi bol´nym i ranenym voinam. Izvestiia glavnogo 
komiteta, 15 October 1914, p. 10.
24  For example, in November 1915 the government attempted to prohibit a meeting of 
the congress of the Union of Zemstvo. L´ vov responded by referring to Nicholas II’s August 
1914 approval of the union’s work. RGVIA, f. 12564, op. 1, d. 9, l. 4.
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only been at times of grave emergency that any form of united action 
by Russia’s local government institutions had been permitted: the Volga 
famine of the early 1890s and the Russo-Japanese war of 1904–05 were 
the only real occasions when the state had permitted concerted action by 
the zemstva.25  It was the exceptional circumstances engendered by the 
outbreak of a full-scale European war that allowed the zemstva and city 
dumas to unite: war was unexpected both in its timing and its scale in 1914. 
The government was taken by surprise both by the onset of war and by the 
powerful wave of patriotism that took hold of Russia in July and August 
1914 and, for a short period, it was caught off balance and was prepared 
to concede rights to public organizations that it had been loath to permit 
for the previous half century. The Minister of Internal Affairs, Nikolai 
Maklakov, recognized this in his submission to a meeting of the Council of 
Ministers on 25 November when he wrote that ‘the war and its surrounding 
fervour have given rise to a range of phenomena that were unforeseen by 
existing legislation and have no precedent in our past’. He noted that, 
once Nicholas II had met L´ vov in Moscow on 6 August, the formation 
of the Zemstvo Union was essentially a fait accompli and there had been 
no proper consideration of their function or organizational structure 
when formal permission was given for their formation of the two unions. 
Maklakov argued that the two bodies were essentially operating beyond 
the confines of the law and that their position should be regularized.26 
 The two unions were, from their initial formation, woven closely into 
the fabric of Russian elite political life. The Zemstvo union attracted 
liberally-minded zemstvo members, and its executive committee included 
men whose views were largely in the centre and liberal wings of Russian 
politics. Headed by L´ vov, the thirteen members of the committee included 
Nikolai Guchkov, the brother of the leader of the Octobrist party, Count 
Vladimir Musin-Pushkin, an elected member of the State Council where 
he sat with the centre group, Ivan Kanshin, an Octobrist member of 
the fourth Duma, Count Fedor Uvarov, an elected member of the State 
Council who had joined the centre-right group, Dmitrii Shchepkin, a 
senior Duma bureaucrat who had worked as the secretary to the Duma 
chairman (and who was to perish in the Stalinist purge in 1937). The 
close relations between the Zemstvo Union and the Union of Towns was 
shown by the inclusion of two representatives from the urban union on 
25  T. I. Polner, Obshchezemskaia organizatsiia na Dal´nem Vostoke, vol. 1, Moscow, 
1908, pp. 5–15.
26  ‘Osobyi zhurnal soveta ministrov, 25 noiabria 1914 goda’, Osobye zhurnaly Soveta 
ministrov Rossiiskoi imperii. 1914 god., Moscow, 2006, pp. 545–46.
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the zemstvo executive committee: Nikolai Astrov, a prominent Kadet who 
both sat on the Moscow city duma and was also a bureaucrat working in 
the State Duma, and Mikhail Chelnokov, a leading Kadet who had been a 
member of the State Duma since 1907.27 L´ vov himself was an aristocrat 
and Tula landowner who had been a member of the Union of Liberation in 
the first years of the century and was elected to the First and Second State 
Dumas in 1906 and 1907 where he was close to the Kadet party, although 
not a formal member of the Duma party. He took a particular interest 
in the policy of peasant migration to Siberia and in 1912 was nominated 
as Moscow mayor, but his appointment was rejected by the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs who believed that his public pronouncements showed anti-
government sentiment.28
 The Union of Towns was chaired for its first month by Brianksii until, 
in September 1914, Chelnokov took over at the organization’s helm, and 
its executive committee shared some of the same members as the zemstvo 
union. Astrov, Guchkov and Shchepkin were members of both bodies, 
and the Union of Towns committee also included Vladimir Kuzmin-
Karavaev, a noted lawyer who had been a member of the first and second 
State Dumas, before being defeated in elections to the third Duma in late 
1907. The Union of Towns had strong connections with the Kadet party, 
but when Chelnokov was elected as Moscow mayor in September 1914 and 
took over as chairman of the Union of Towns, he left the Kadet Duma 
party, arguing that in his new position he should stand apart from party 
politics.29 The leadership of both unions was intimately bound up with 
the political structures that had come into being in Russia after the 1905 
October Manifesto. Politics — along with family ties — bound together the 
men who ran the organizations, but it would be a mistake to see the unions 
simply as offshoots of the Russian political parties that espoused centrist 
and liberal views. The unions recognized that they had to represent 
the full breadth of opinion in Russian local government and could not 
adopt narrowly partisan approaches to politics. Only a single provincial 
zemstvo — Kursk — stood apart from the zemstvo union, while the Union 
of Towns grew dramatically after its formation. In September 1914, the 
union counted 195 towns among its members, but by January 1915 it had 
expanded to represent 428 municipalities and in September 1917 it included 
630 towns — some 75 per cent of the towns of the empire outside enemy 
27  Lichnyi sostav uchrezhdenii vserossiiskogo zemskogo soiuza, Moscow, 1915, p. 4.
28  T. I. Polner, Zhiznennyi put´ kniazia Georgiia Evgenevicha L´ vova. Lichnost .´ Vzgliady. 
Usloviia deiatel´nosti,  Moscow, 2001, pp. 241–45.
29  Shevyrin, Vlast´ i obshchestvennye, pp. 42–43.
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occupied territory.30 Astrov, one of the most vocal and radical members of 
the leadership of the Union of Towns, wrote that 
the union never promoted the policy of one or other political party. We 
were free from party directives. There was a tacit agreement between the 
members of the Union and the political parties to which we belonged. 
In our political pronouncements we expressed the attitudes of the social 
groups that were united by the Union of Towns and formulated these 
ideas.31 
 The formation of the two unions was not prompted by political parties 
but, given the relatively small number of men who were active in Russian 
national and local political circles, it was unsurprising that the two unions 
were led by men who had played a significant part in the legislative 
institutions that had been created in 1905 and 1906. Enthusiasm for the 
work of the unions was generated by the circumstances of the outbreak of 
war, but it also reflected the frustrations of liberal and centre politicians at 
the way in which they had been marginalized in the Duma and the State 
Council. The brusque curtailment of the national Duma franchise in June 
1907, and the subsequent reduction in liberal representation in the Third 
and Fourth Dumas, dashed the expectations of an opportunity for open 
political work that had been created in October 1905. The Kadet party, 
in particular, had been hounded by the Russian government after its call 
for civil disobedience in the 1906 Vyborg Manifesto and its members felt 
deeply frustrated by the way in which Russia’s constitutional politics had 
developed. Ariadna Tyrkova, a prominent Kadet, noted how interest in 
Kadet party politics had declined by 1914, so that ‘only half a dozen people 
turned up to party congresses’ and how Kadet members saw it as desirable 
‘to intensify their practical work in the public organizations in every 
possible way’.32 The centrist Octobrist party had also ossified and almost 
ceased its extra-parliamentary activity.33 The formation of the two unions 
aimed at giving assistance to Russia’s wounded provided a practical outlet 
for the energies of Russia’s moderate and liberal politicians and, moreover, 
involved them in work that was irreproachable in its aims and content.
30  Tumanova, Obshchestvennye organisatsii Rossii, p. 99. 
31  Ibid., p. 100.
32  Protokoly Tsentral´nogo komiteta i zagranichnykh grupp Konstitutsionno-
demokraticheskoi partii, 1905–ser. 1930-kh gg., 6 vols, Moscow, 1994–99, vol. 2, pp. 364–66.
33  F. A. Gaida, Liberal´naia oppositsiia n putiakh k vlasti (1914–vesna 1917 g.), Moscow, 
2003, p. 48.
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 The war on Russia’s western borders accelerated very quickly. The 
policy agreed between the French and Russian military before the outbreak 
of war assumed that the brunt of the initial German attack would come in 
Western Europe and that, therefore, the Russians must open an offensive 
early in the war to distract the Germans from their onslaught on the 
French. Russian troops crossed the border into East Prussia on 4 August, 
the sixteenth day of the war, and two Russian armies were ordered to 
entrap the German forces in a pincer and force them to retreat. The 
Russian strategy proved to be wholly unsuccessful: the forested lakeland of 
East Prussia was difficult terrain for an offensive, while Russian command 
was at times chaotic and the actions of the Russian forces were poorly 
coordinated. The railway network on the Russian side of the border was 
weakly developed, making it difficult for the Russians to move their 
troops quickly and easily. Within two weeks, the Russian armies had been 
routed by the Germans: the Second Army was encircled by the Germans 
and its commander, General Samsonov, committed suicide. The battle 
of Tannenberg was followed by a German advance that pushed Russian 
troops back across the border in the battle of the Masurian Lakes, bringing 
an ignominious end to the first Russian actions of the war.34 Russia fared 
much better against the Austro-Hungarian armies in Galicia and was able 
to seize the city of L´ vov on August 21, but only at the cost of very heavy 
casualties. More than 100,000 Russian soldiers were taken prisoner by the 
Germans in East Prussia and 40,000 were imprisoned to the Austrians in 
Galicia, but these figures were dwarfed by the numbers of men who were 
killed and wounded. Some 100,000 Russian troops lost their lives in the 
battles of 1914, and more than 210,000 were wounded between the outbreak 
of war and early October.35 
 The Russian army had made substantial preparations for dealing with 
casualties, drawing on the experience of the war with Japan a decade 
earlier. There was an official recognition that the numbers of casualties 
in a major European war would far exceed anything seen in the wars of 
the nineteenth century, and that it was therefore essential to evacuate the 
wounded as quickly as possible from the battlefield. The Russo-Japanese 
war had shown that it was vital to have a cohesive set of organizations 
dealing with the wounded since, as the General Staff noted ‘the absence 
34  M. V. Os´ kin, Istoriia pervoi mirovoi voiny, Moscow, 2014, pp. 100–07; N. Stone, The 
Eastern Front 1914–1917, London, 1998, pp. 59–69.
35  RGVIA, f. 2003, op. 2, d. 426, l. 7. B. Ts. Urlanis, Istoriia voennykh poter´ . Voiny i 
narodonaselenie Evropy. Liudskie poteri vooruzhennykh sil Evropeiskikh stran v voinakh 
XVII–XX vv. (istoriko-statisticheskoe issledovanie), St Petersburg, 1994, pp. 142–46.
PETER WALDRON646
of coordination and communication in the activity of [evacuation] 
institutions was a serious defect in the evacuation work in the war’.36 The 
military planning for dealing with the wounded in the event of a war was 
based on dividing Russia into two zones. The area closest to the front line, 
west of a line from Lake Ladoga in the north, through Smolensk to Azov 
in the south was under the exclusive control of the military authorities, 
while civilian bodies were responsible for the rest of the empire. Military 
planning envisaged that only the army would work in the western areas, 
and that public organizations, while they could offer widespread material 
help, would be restricted to playing a role outside the military zone.37 
The evacuation administration of the General Staff was to take charge 
of the process and the wounded would be taken to first aid points close 
to the battlefield and, after basic treatment, be transported by hospital 
trains to distribution centres in cities in the Russian interior where they 
would spend a few days having their injuries assessed.38 The least seriously 
injured would then be moved to other cities where they would be under 
the care of public organizations. The military understood that there would 
be significant demand for hospital trains and, when the chairman of the 
Russian Red Cross addressed representatives from towns in the Moscow 
evacuation district on 31 July, he indicated that the army would welcome 
assistance from public organizations in equipping trains. The civilian 
ministries had also considered their needs in the case of war in the wake of 
the conflict with Japan, and in 1908 the Council of Ministers had requested 
each ministry to report on the issues that faced it in preparing a plan for 
national defence. None of the ministries mentioned the need to prepare for 
caring for large numbers of wounded, indicating the lack of responsibility 
that they each felt for providing medical services across the empire.39
 Even though the Chief of the General Staff had acknowledged in a 
1911 report that the scale of casualties would be much greater than during 
previous wars, the military continued to base their calculations of the 
likely numbers of wounded on the experience of previous conflicts. The 
general staff believed that, with its knowledge of the size and composition 
of the armies on the battlefield, it could predict the numbers of casualties 
36  ‘Doklad nachal´nika general´nogo shtaba voennomu ministru, 21 maia 1911’, 
Sanitarnaia sluzhba russkoi armii v voine 1914–1917 gg. (Sbornik dokumentov), Kuibyshev, 
1942 (hereafter Sanitarnaia sluzhba), pp. 48–49.
37  Laurie S. Stoff, Russia’s Sisters of Mercy and the Great War: More than Binding Men’s 
Wounds, Lawrence, KS, 2015, pp. 48–49.
38  I. B. Belova, Pervaia mirovia voina i rossiiskaia provintsiia 1914–fevral´ 1917, Moscow, 
2011, p. 130.
39  St Petersburg, Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Istoricheskii Arkhiv, f. 1276, op. 4, d. 130, 
ll. 430–46. I am grateful to Dominic Lieven for this reference.
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very precisely and it estimated that Moscow — at the centre of the Russian 
railway network and thus likely to take the bulk of wounded — would 
receive between 35,000 and 70,000 casualties each month.40 Speaking in 
early August, Samarin — the head of the Russian Red Cross — was even 
more precise in his estimates of the numbers of wounded that would require 
treatment. The general staff had identified seven cities as distribution 
centres for casualties and had calculated that there would be a total of 
119,700 wounded men each month, allocating 3,000 to Vologda, 11,200 to 
Tver´ , 25,000 to Rzhev, 18,000 to Viazama, 26,500 to Briansk, 17,500 to Kursk 
and 18,500 to Khar´ kov. Wounded men would be transferred from these 
towns to treatment points, with Moscow taking the heaviest load of 35,000 
men each month. Rostov, Samara and Voronezh were each to receive more 
than 20,000 wounded a month, with 2,500 going to Perm´ .41 The planning 
set out the details of the railway routes that hospital trains were to take 
to transport casualties, identifying five routes by which wounded would 
arrive in Moscow. The general staff estimated that sixteen hospital trains 
would be needed to transport the wounded inside the Moscow evacuation 
district, with a further sixty six trains required to bring casualties from the 
front.42 
 While the general staff had set out the basic elements of its evacuation 
plan for casualties, much remained uncertain when war broke out. It 
very quickly became clear that, while the army had made very precise 
calculations about the number of casualties and how they should be 
treated, it had failed to move beyond its paper planning to ensure that 
the physical and human resources needed to implement its plans were in 
place. The Moscow city board expressed significant concerns about the 
ability of the city to cope with the scale of the task that it was expected to 
deal with. At its meeting on 28 July, the board set out the gulf that existed 
between its planned role and the current extent of provision for receiving 
casualties: while the city was expected to take at least 35,000 wounded men 
each month, the city board noted that Moscow hospitals had only a total of 
3,500 beds available. At the same time, there had been no discussion of how 
to provide all the necessary equipment for treating the wounded, and the 
city board questioned the availability of basic medical supplies and linen.43 
40  TsGAM, f. 179, op. 60, d. 791, ll. 35–36, Zhurnal predstavilelei gorodov i zemstv, 
prinadlezhashchikh k Moskovskomu Evakuatsionnomu okrugu, po voprosam pomoshchi 
bol´nym i ranenym voinam, iulia 31 dnia 1914 goda. 
41  S˝ezd gorodskikh golov, p. 7.
42  TsGAM, f. 179, op. 60, d. 1, l. 22, ‘Po evakuatsii ranenykh i bol n´ykh v predelakh 
Moskovskogo okruga’.
43  RGVIA, f. 12593, d. 1, ll. 83–84, Zhurnal No. 1 soveshchaniia Moskovskoi Gorodskoi 
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 The rapid engagement of the Russian armies in East Prussia brought the 
plans for dealing with casualties into sharp focus. The first train carrying 
casualties arrived in Moscow on 6 August and within three days some 
2,000 wounded men had been transported to the city.44 Within a few days 
there were reports of increasing numbers of trains arriving in Moscow, and 
the city authorities quickly realized that the situation was becoming very 
difficult. It was clear that the casualties had not been fed while they were 
on the trains bringing them to Moscow, while seriously wounded men were 
being transported in the same railway carriages as men who had only light 
injuries. Within two weeks of the first arrivals of casualties in Moscow, the 
position had become desperate. The city had insufficient places to house 
the wounded who were arriving each day, and by 18 August the ‘huge and 
wholly unexpected flood of wounded men’ meant that it was forced to take 
over the Brest night-shelter to house casualties, even though the building 
was entirely unsuitable for this purpose. Every vacant building at Moscow 
railway stations was requisitioned as temporary accommodation for the 
wounded and, even when all available railway buildings had been acquired 
to use for casualties, there were still insufficient beds for the men. On 23 
August, the city board heard a report that the wounded would now have to 
lie on the floor in any vacant public building that could be found and that, 
therefore, as much straw as possible must be bought from the city’s markets 
to provide basic bedding.45 Other cities in western Russia found themselves 
under similar pressure. The city of Kaluga received less than a day’s notice 
of the arrival of more than 1,100 wounded men in mid-August and were 
told that a further 600 casualties would be sent there. The Kaluga mayor 
reported that the war ministry had refused to make any contribution to the 
costs of caring for the wounded and stated that Kaluga could take no more 
casualties.46 The Moscow city board declared on 18 August that the war 
ministry’s evacuation plans had collapsed and that the city was having to 
take on tasks that were wholly unexpected. The board was angry that the 
ministry was incapable of fulfilling its legal duty to care for casualties, and 
that the city of Moscow was being placed in such a difficult position.47 
 The seriousness of the situation facing the army in dealing with 
casualties was all too obvious to observers. The head of the General Staff ’s 
evacuation section wrote on 10 August that: 
Upravy s predstavitel´iami obshchestvennykh uchrezhdenii i organizatsii g. Moskvy. Iiulia 
28 dnia 1914 goda. 
44  TsGAM, f. 179, op. 60, d. 791, l. 78.
45  TsGAM, f. 179, op. 60, d. 769, ll. 60, 72, 81–85, 94, 103.
46  TsGAM, f. 179, op. 60, d. 1, 128.
47  TSGAM, f. 179, op. 60, d. 769, ll. 85, 107.
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wounded and sick have started to arrive in the internal evacuation zone 
from the front. For the moment, numbers are small, but more men 
can be expected every day. The institutions of the internal evacuation 
organizations are however, completely unprepared to receive and 
accommodate casualties: distribution and regional evacuation points have 
not been set up; hospitals have not been organized; medical and other 
staff have not been selected and assigned to appropriate locations; the 
war ministry does not have proper hospitals for the long-term care of the 
wounded and the mobilization plans include no provision to establish or 
staff such institutions. It is plain that the internal evacuation organizations 
have neither the ability to receive casualties, nor to care for them.48 
The desperate situation confronting the army was especially clear in the 
region just behind the front line: the head of the Vil n´a railway police sent 
a telegram to his colleague in Baranovichi on 19 August reporting that 
‘more than 3,000 casualties have been crammed into Pinsk station over the 
past two days. Some men have not been fed for two days. The evacuation 
commission has not organized transport or food. Discontent is growing 
among the men’. Two days later on 21 August, the chief of the general staff 
sent a telegram to the quartermaster of the South Western front on 21 
August noting that 
yesterday a train filled with wounded troops from Kholm made up of fifty-
two goods wagons travelled from Baranovichi to Minsk without any food 
or medical supplies. The wounded have not been fed or had their dressings 
changed for several days and have no money. The commander-in-chief 
has ordered the most decisive measures be taken to deal with the medical 
organization of the army […] for your information, the head of the medical 
section at the front-line is being replaced by a general. 
The quartermaster replied that ‘the mobilization timetable requires 100 
field hospitals to be established in the South West reserve region. […] So 
far, only fifty four hospitals have arrived. We are short of forty six field 
hospitals. The need for them is huge’.49 
 Newspapers reported on the pressures that the wounded placed on 
the empire’s social fabric. During September 1914 Moskovskie vedomosti 
published a series of commentaries entitled ‘The Wounded’, noting on 3 
48  ‘Raport nachal n´ika evakuatsionnogo upravleniia GUGSh i. d. nachal n´ika GUGSh, 
10 avgusta 1914 g.’, Sanitarnaia sluzhba, pp. 209–10.
49  Ibid., pp. 210–11.
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September that ‘the most typical feature of Moscow life now is the wounded. 
[…] a sad and heart-rending landscape’.50 The following week, the newspaper 
reported that ‘there are now very many wounded in Moscow. All the public 
and private hospitals are overcrowded. Everyone is asking for the lightly-
wounded and convalescent to be moved elsewhere’.51 The Russian political 
and social elite took a keen interest in the treatment of casualties. The 
Dowager Empress Mariia Fedorovna wrote in her diary on 9 August that 
‘the Red Cross is behaving marvellously, in contrast to the war ministry 
which is doing precisely nothing to help the wounded’ and she demanded 
that Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, the Commander-in-Chief, take 
urgent action to prepare a proper evacuation plan for the wounded.52 Count 
Ivan Tolstoi, the Petrograd mayor, reported a conversation with a Moscow 
politician who ‘painted a terrible picture of the condition of casualties in 
the old capital: there were now upwards of 35,000 wounded men there, 
but there were not enough hospital places for them, so many walk the 
streets in hospital gowns, asking for charity from passers-by’.53 Sergei 
Mel g´unov, the former Kadet politician and prolific journalist, commented 
in his diary on the disorganization and lack of preparedness for dealing 
with the wounded. He recounted reports of fully-staffed hospitals that 
had no patients, while others had hundreds of wounded to care for, but 
only a handful of nurses.54 The organization of care for the wounded was 
in a state of extreme disarray and Mel g´unov noted that hospitals were 
short of bandages and clothing for their patients. His sister, Praskoviia 
Mel g´unova, wrote in her diary in September 1914 that the military hospital 
on Ekaterinskaia square had 600 patients, but only eight nurses and three 
doctors. Operations were being carried out without anaesthetic and ‘there 
were cries of pain’ throughout the building.55 The chairman of the State 
Duma, Rodzianko, wrote to Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, expressing 
the concern of society about the disorganization of medical care for the 
wounded. The commander in chief responded to Rodzianko, recognizing 
the poor organization for dealing with the wounded and explaining that 
it was due to the very rapid engagement of Russia’s troops in full-scale 
fighting along a front that was more than 700 km in length. Disturbed 
by the reaction to the chaos, Nikolai Nikolaevich instructed Prince P. A. 
50  Moskovskie vedomosti, 3 September 1914, p. 3.
51  Moskovskie vedomosti, 10 September 1914, p. 4.
52  Dnevniki Imperatritsy Marii Fedorovny (1914–1920, 1923 gody), Moscow, 2005, p. 52.
53  I. I. Tolstoi, Dnevnik 1906–1916, St Petersburg, 1997, p. 546.
54  S. P. Mel g´unov, Vospominania i dnevniki, Moscow, 2003, p. 243.
55  ‘K zapisiam 1914–1916 gg. Otryvki iz dnevninka P. E. Mel g´unovoi’, ibid., p. 281.
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Oldenburgskii, the newly-appointed head of the sanitary and evacuation 
department, to hold a meeting with Rodzianko and discuss with him 
what was being done and what would be done in the future to alleviate the 
situation.56 
 In these chaotic circumstances, Russia’s local government institutions 
were able to stake their claim to play a major part in providing assistance to 
Russia’s military casualties. The official report of a meeting of the Moscow 
zemstvo on 25 July included a vigorous rallying call to action: 
with the first rumblings of the coming storm, and simultaneously with 
the shouts of victory, there will also be heard the groans of thousands 
and tens of thousands of men wounded and dying on the battlefield. 
It becomes, therefore, the duty of those who remain at home to strain 
every effort to render them timely aid. Those left at home should take up 
positions in regular battle array, so as to be ready to carry out quickly, 
promptly and efficiently the task of aiding the sick and wounded that will 
confront them and will probably assume gigantic proportions. Who, if 
not public institutions whose business is to provide for the needs of the 
people and who have had many years of practical experience in caring for 
the sick, with organized forces at their command, should undertake the 
task of uniting the isolated forces in this great work, which demands such 
complex organization?57 
The collapse of the war ministry’s plans to evacuate and treat casualties 
meant that there was an immediate need for Russia’s local government 
institutions to provide assistance, especially in Moscow. The scale of the 
help needed was initially unclear: on 23 July the Moscow city board heard 
a report that Moscow hospitals could accommodate 1,600 casualties.58 
However, when representatives from the Moscow evacuation district met 
on 31 July, it was reported that civilian patients had been discharged from 
hospitals where possible, so that the city now had 3,500 vacant beds, with 
the intention that this would rapidly rise to 10,000. Moscow University 
promised to take a further 600 casualties immediately and, could, in case 
of necessity, increase this to 2,000. The Moscow zemstvo offered up to 
10,000 hospital beds, but it was clear that, even with these promises of 
56  A. B. Astashov, ‘Soiuzy zemstv i gorodov i pomoshch´ ranenym v pervuiu mirovuiu 
voinu’, Otechestvennaia istoriia, 1992, no. 6, pp. 169–72, (p. 171).
57  Vserossiiskii zemskii soiuz pomoshchi bol’nym i ranenym voinam. Obzor deiatel´nosti 
Glavnogo Komiteta. 1 avgust 1914 – 1 fevral´ 1915, Moscow, 1915, pp. 20–21.
58  TsGAM, f. 179, op. 60, d. 769, l. 12.
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help, the total number of beds offered was likely to be less than half of what 
would be required. There was a recognition that the figures for casualties 
calculated by the war ministry were purely theoretical and that the actual 
numbers of wounded could be two or three times as many as the army 
had predicted.59 Two days later the Moscow city board estimated that the 
city might receive up to 50,000 casualties each month and appealed for 
every public organization — merchant associations, the Stock Exchange 
committee, gentry assemblies, trade associations and monasteries — to 
play a part in providing assistance.60 When the preparatory committee 
for the Union of Towns met on 3 August, it recognized the enormity of 
the task facing it. The new organization saw its immediate priorities as 
being to find premises to accommodate the wounded, establish hospitals, 
the evacuation of the wounded, coordinating the purchasing of supplies 
to provide medical care, organizing the sewing of linen, providing help 
to soldiers’ families and collecting financial contributions to support its 
work.61 
 The initial stresses of war were also felt in Russia’s provincial towns 
and cities. The Viazma representative at the meeting of city mayors in 
early August noted how the task of caring for the wounded presented 
significant difficulties for his town of 100,000 people. Viazma needed new 
buildings to accommodate casualties, while it had a severe shortage of 
medical personnel. More problematically, the city was located in the area of 
Russia that was under military control and therefore public organizations 
were not permitted to play a part in evacuating and treating the wounded. 
Representatives from Voronezh, Nizhnii-Novgorod, Kaluga and Tver 
reported that their cities each lacked the financial resources to implement 
plans for evacuating and caring for the wounded, while the Kursk delegate 
noted that his city could fulfil barely one tenth of what was being demanded 
of it.62 Casualties were arriving in cities to the south west of Moscow from 
mid-August. In Orel, the provincial governor agreed with the Orthodox 
church to take over the spacious premises of the diocesan girls’ school to 
accommodate wounded men, while the local military authorities provided 
a barracks building in the town of El e´ts to take 1,000 casualties so that by 
59  TsGAM, f. 179, op. 60, d. 791, ll. 34–41, Zhurnal predstavilelei gorodov i zemstv, 
prinadlezhashchikh k Moskovskomu Evakuatsionnomu okrugu, po voprosam pomoshchi 
bol’nym i ranenym voinam, iulia 31 dnia 1914 goda.
60  TSGAM f. 179, op. 60, d. 769, l. 16.
61  TSGAM, f. 179, op. 60, d. 791, l. 72, Zhurnal predvaritel´nogo komiteta po organizatsii 
obshc-gorodskogo vserossiiskogo s”ezda, 3 avgusta 1914 goda.
62  S˝ezd gorodskikh golov, pp. 28–33.
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the end of August the province was able to house 3,000 wounded men.63 
At the same time, the Nizhnii-Novgorod mayor reported that the city had 
been unable to accommodate 300 casualties in zemstvo hospitals, as they 
were unprepared for such an influx of wounded and asked for proper 
communication between the various organizations involved in evacuating 
casualties.64 
 Russian local government acted quickly to provide help to military 
causalities. Immediately after the establishment of the zemstvo union 
was approved by the government, the union began to plan the way in 
which casualties could be distributed across Russia’s provinces, making 
calculations for different numbers of wounded and working out the 
movement of hospital trains to evacuate men from the front line. By the 
middle of August the national zemstvo union had decided to equip fifty 
hospital trains to evacuate the wounded, although a shortage of suitable 
railway wagons meant that the trains could not be brought into immediate 
service. The war ministry, recognizing that its initial insistence on 
excluding public organizations from the war zone was untenable, asked for 
twenty trains to be sent to the front line. Each train would convey nearly 
400 casualties and by late August the first zemstvo trains were at work.65 
The union then began to identify suitable hospitals, initially using existing 
institutions. It was immediately clear that these institutions would not be 
adequate, and the union looked for any buildings close to both existing 
hospitals and to railway stations. By the middle of September, the Moscow 
zemstvo was able to report that it had almost 18,000 beds available for 
casualties. The Moscow provincial zemstvo equipped four of its own 
hospital trains to move the wounded across the fifteen provinces of the 
Moscow region, and in the first five months of war the Moscow zemstvo 
was able to evacuate nearly 120,000 men.66
 The work of evacuating casualties and treating their injuries revealed 
that Russia’s soldiers needed much greater levels of assistance. The 
wounded had to be fed, and the two unions began to establish feeding 
stations at key points along the railway routes where hospital trains ran. 
As summer ran into autumn, the casualties required warm clothing and 
mayors in both Vladimir and Nizhnii-Novgorod reported that they had 
purchased winter clothes and footwear. The newly-established hospitals 
63  Belova, Pervaia mirovia voina, p. 132.
64  RGVIA, f. 12564, op. 1, d. 22, l. 3.
65  Vserossiiskii zemskii soiuz pomoshchi bol´nym i ranenym voinam. Izvestiia glavnogo 
komiteta, 15 October 1914, pp. 14–15, 31.
66  RGVIA, f. 12564, op.1 , d. 3, ll. 7–8.
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also required equipping and the Union of Towns began work to organize a 
central linen store, while it also sought to deal with the shortage of medical 
instruments by sending sample sets of instruments to provincial towns 
to show local manufacturers what was needed. Provincial cities each had 
their own needs: it was reported that Kiev required bathhouses for the 
wounded men, while Zhitomir needed basic first aid material and Viatka 
was short of linen. A report in autumn 1914 identified the serious situation 
facing men who had lost limbs as a result of their injuries and the Union 
of Towns agreed that a workshop should be established to manufacture 
prostheses.67 
 Despite the level of detailed planning by the two unions in the first weeks 
of the war, the situation remained chaotic and confused. Moscow’s position 
at the centre of the Russian railway network meant that it continued to 
receive the greatest number of wounded men. The city Duma tried to 
relieve the pressure on the city’s hospitals by offering private individuals 
twelve rubles per month if they would take care of a lightly wounded man 
in their own homes. The Duma considered requisitioning private property 
to provide accommodation for the wounded, and it also faced a significant 
shortage of doctors and other medical personnel to treat casualties. Even 
when men recovered from their injuries, it was difficult to discharge 
them from hospital: many of the soldiers had inadequate clothing and by 
mid-September the Moscow city Duma had to limit the distribution of 
clothing to convalescent soldiers otherwise it would have no supplies for 
newly arrived men. To try to ameliorate the situation, the Duma proposed 
to organize a ‘clothing collection week’ in Moscow. Even when soldiers 
could be discharged from hospital care, the army was reluctant to accept 
them back into its ranks, as by September 1914 the army’s own distribution 
points were overwhelmed and chaotic.68 
 The financial costs of providing such widespread care to the wounded 
were very substantial and the question of how the work of local government 
was to be funded was very high on the agenda for both the national unions 
and individual zemstva and city councils. The two unions made it clear 
to the Russian government that they could only provide support to the 
wounded if they received significant financial assistance from the national 
government. At the first meeting of the Union of Towns it was agreed to 
send a delegation to Petrograd to make it plain that, while Russia’s cities 
were ready to use all the resources they could generate themselves by 
67  RGVIA, f. 12593, d. 46, ll. 50, 63–64, 79.
68  TsGAM, f. 179, op. 60, d. 769, ll. 107–17, 145; d. 770, l. 8.
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reducing their other activities and by seeking loans, they needed financial 
help from the government in order to carry out all the tasks that were 
needed.69 Brianskii, the Moscow mayor and chairman of the Union 
of Towns, travelled to Petrograd as soon as the organization had been 
established and had a sympathetic hearing from the government. On 12 
August he met Goremykin, the chairman of the Council of Ministers, 
Maklakov, the Minister of Internal Affairs, Bark, the Minister of Finance 
and Krivoshein, the head of the agriculture department. The ministers 
promised financial assistance to the new organization, with one million 
rubles to be provided immediately and a further twenty million rubles 
once the union had produced detailed estimates of expenditure.70 
 Financial contributions also came from a wide variety of individuals 
and groups. Sergei Morozov, the Moscow businessman and art patron, 
donated 500,000 rubles to the zemstvo union and a further 200,000 rubles 
to the Union of Towns in August 1914 — and was received personally by 
Nicholas II and thanked for his contributions. The Petrograd city Duma 
board contributed 100,000 rubles to the union, while it also received 
donations in kind, including one of 500 bottles of wine. Funding also 
came directly from the military, with the Moscow army commander 
contributing 4,000 rubles towards the cost of clothing for casualties. By 
the end of August, the unions had gained a better idea of the scale of the 
financial resources needed to cope with the demands being placed upon 
them. They estimated that some 104 million rubles was required to assist 
with caring for casualties in the area of the empire outside the military 
zone: the provision of a single hospital bed cost 125 rubles, while the unions 
needed three million rubles to equip bathhouses, feeding stations and 
temporary barracks, and a further five million rubles was needed to spend 
on measures to combat the spread of infectious diseases and 1.3 million 
rubles for linen. The Moscow military commander was asked to provide a 
further 50,000 rubles to clothe regular soldiers who were being discharged; 
the Union of Towns estimated that they needed 40,000 winter coats, 
50,000 hats and 40,000 pairs of boots.71 The Union of Towns held further 
meetings with ministers early in September, and the government repeated 
its promise to provide the necessary resources for the work of the unions. 
69  RGVIA, f. 12593, d. 1, 30–31, Zhurnal No 1 Komiteta Vserossiiskogo Gorodskogo Soiuza 
pomoshchi bol´nym i ranenym.
70  RGVIA, f. 12593, d. 46, l. 51.
71  RGVIA, f. 12593, d. 1, l. 229, 152, 238, 249, Zhurnal No 3 Komiteta Vserossiiskogo 
Gorodskogo Soiuza pomoshchi bol´nym i ranenym; Vserossiiskii zemskii soiuz pomoshchi 
bol’nym i ranenym voinam. Izvestiia glavnogo komiteta, 15 October 1914, pp. 8, 11.
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In the first six weeks of war, the Union of Towns received 3.6 million rubles 
as income, with more than eighty per cent provided by the government. At 
their meeting on 5 September, members of the union’s executive committee 
wanted confirmation that the finance from the government was an 
outright grant and were assured that L´ vov had seen minutes of a Council 
of Ministers meeting confirming this.72 
 Finance provided only one of the tensions that accompanied the 
establishment of the two national unions. There were reports of stresses at 
local level between urban authorities and local zemstva, and the national 
unions emphasized that it was important for the two sets of organizations 
to work together at local level in the same spirit of cooperation that was 
being displayed nationally. The Union of Towns executive committee 
stressed that this was the first occasion when two strong representative 
bodies were working together in Russia and that it was important not 
to damage the unions’ reputation in the eyes of the government.73 The 
relationship between the new unions and the government was, however, 
much more difficult than the stresses between local bodies on the ground. 
Even though the government welcomed the work that the unions could do 
to help Russia’s casualties and provided funding to the new organizations, 
it was very concerned that the new organizations would try to expand their 
area of activity. At the initial meeting between Brianskii and government 
ministers in mid-August, the government promised to instruct provincial 
governors to allow both local zemstva and city councils to hold congresses. 
In September the Ministry of Internal Affairs gave permission for a 
national congress of the Union of Towns, but it was very concerned about 
the union extending its area of activity and emphasized that the congress 
must not discuss topics that were outside its immediate remit, in particular, 
it must avoid the issues of assistance to soldiers’ families and of food supply 
to Russian cities.74 The November meeting of the Council of Ministers 
that discussed the position of the two national unions received a report 
from Maklakov, the Minister of Internal Affairs, in which he expressed his 
concern at the establishment of ‘such powerful public organizations’ that 
stood outside the legislation governing the activities of individual zemstva 
and city Dumas. Maklakov wanted to impose tight controls on the unions, 
72  RGVIA, f. 12593, d. 1, ll. 260–61, Zhurnal No 4 Komiteta Vserossiiskogo Gorodskogo 
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especially by subordinating their financial affairs to the regulations of the 
State Comptroller. The Council of Ministers, however, concluded that the 
temporary nature of the unions’ work meant that their uncertain legal 
status did not pose an insuperable problem. The ministers did recognize 
Maklakov’s concerns and, while they did not agree with all his proposals, 
noted that the State Comptroller already had the power to audit the 
unions’ finances. The meeting did concur with Maklakov’s proposal that 
local authorities should be able to insist on the dismissal of inappropriate 
individuals from service in the unions.75 
 These concerns about the views and character of the unions’ employees 
resulted in the Department of Police’s Special Section scrutinising the staff 
of the unions. In November 1914 the head of the army’s evacuation service 
wrote to the Warsaw okhrana noting that he had received information 
that staff of hospital trains running between Warsaw and Vil n´a were 
engaged in spreading revolutionary propaganda and requesting the police 
to investigate the train staff and observe their activity. Similar concerns 
were expressed by Danilov, the army’s Quartermaster-General, who 
requested the help of the okhrana in combating ‘systematic propaganda’ 
being carried out on hospital trains. The police responded by sending 
undercover agents to work on hospital trains and attempted to carry out 
checks on each member of the staff of the trains. The police compiled 
detailed information on the staff of the Warsaw hospital train, but found 
it very difficult to identify each individual accurately, since information 
from different regional police departments was often contradictory.76 
Nevertheless, two people working on the Warsaw hospital train did 
emerge from the okhrana files: Olga Brillantova, a doctor, had been 
arrested in March 1913 in connection with a student strike at the Women’s 
Medical Institute and Mariia Iushina, a nurse, had been a member of 
the Vologda Socialist Revolutionary party and had been placed under 
police surveillance. Even placing a police agent on the train to conduct 
surveillance proved awkward, and could only be carried out in Moscow 
where each train’s staff was assembled. The police proposed that all the 
staff of hospital trains should be registered and that anyone who the police 
identified as politically unreliable should be dismissed, while each train 
should carry a police informant as a member of its staff.77 
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 The establishment of the two national unions created immediate 
tensions with the government at both national and local levels. The 
unions came into existence very quickly in the first weeks of war when 
it became plain that the army’s planning for dealing with casualties was 
wholly inadequate. The exigencies of a major European war exposed the 
weakness of the army’s preparations for conflict very publicly: the chaotic 
scenes as thousands of wounded men were evacuated from the battle 
zone were obvious to much of Russian society. Moscow, Russia’s second 
largest city and at the heart of the national railway network, was suddenly 
and unexpectedly transformed into the national centre for dealing with 
military casualties. In August and September 1914 more than 120,000 
wounded men arrived in the city for treatment. The appearance in this 
great metropolis of clear evidence of the war being fought on Russia’s 
western borders provoked mixed responses among the city’s population. 
For many, the experience of war provoked a new sense of national unity. In 
October 1914 Moskovskie vedomosti reported on a sense of renewal among 
students and the intelligentsia, writing that ‘we have found our common 
language […] we have all recognized that we are Russian sons of a single 
great and indivisible Russia’.78 The newspaper was keen to emphasize the 
way in which the war ‘has drawn together our fragmented society’79 and 
the widespread ways in which Russian society contributed to the care 
of military casualties provided clear evidence of the way in which war 
provided a sense of national purpose. An article in Russkoe slovo in early 
September described a visit by a correspondent to a Moscow friend who 
had taken in five wounded men to live in his apartment, accommodating 
three men in the sitting room and two in the study, with the owner himself 
now living in the kitchen.80 Organizations as well as private individuals 
contributed to the care of casualties: during September the press reported 
daily on the opening of new hospitals, with 240 beds in twelve hospitals 
opening on 18 September, including a twelve-bed hospital in the premises 
of the Solov e´v Religious-Philosophical Society and a further thirteen 
hospitals opening on 24 September, including a 300-bed hospital in the 
Trekhgornyi brewery.81 When confronted in their own city with the 
evidence of the war, many Muscovites rallied to support their troops and 
provided very substantial resources to care for Russia’s casualties. Among 
the goodwill towards the wounded men, however, was a recognition 
78  Moskovskie vedomosti, 17 October 1914, p. 1.
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81  Moskovskie vedomosti, 18 September 1914, p. 3; 24 September 1914, p. 3.
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of Moscow’s unpreparedness to deal with the crisis that confronted it, 
especially with the onset of winter.82
 The government was deeply ambivalent about the two unions. It 
recognized that the pressures of the war, and the failure of its own plans 
to deal with casualties, meant that it had to accept the help of local 
government institutions in evacuating and treating the wounded. Its 
own resources were insufficient for the task of dealing with hundreds 
of thousands of casualties, and it could not ignore the men’s plight or 
delay evacuating and treating them. The Russian government was caught 
off-balance by the speed with which its armies suffered casualties in the 
first weeks of war, so that the two national unions were able to establish 
themselves without going through the normal protracted legal processes 
needed to form associations in tsarist Russia. The unions thus emerged 
in August 1914 without clear definitions of their sphere of activity and 
without having had the Ministry of Internal Affairs scrutinize their 
constitutions and rules. This gave them very considerable latitude as the 
war developed, especially when the military situation continued to worsen 
during 1915. Most of the men involved at the centre of the two unions 
were highly experienced political figures, whether in provincial zemstva, 
city councils or the national Duma and State Council. They were well 
versed in the intricacies of Russian politics in the post-1905 era and had 
an innate comprehension of the tensions that existed between the Russian 
government and political and social institutions. For them, the patriotic 
duty of aiding Russia’s wounded troops provided an opportunity for a 
marginalized Russian political class to wield real authority. 
 The summer and early autumn of 1914 thus brought about a fundamental 
change in the structures of authority inside the Russian empire, as central 
government was forced to concede power to organizations that were outside 
its control and headed by men who, while part of the social elite, were 
largely inimical to the way in which Russia was governed. The commitment 
that social organizations demonstrated to the war effort did not represent 
a rapprochement with the government: the failings of the regime were laid 
bare as the chaos of the evacuation and treatment of Russia’s casualties 
become all too evident during August and September 1914 and this only 
added to existing disillusionment with the government. The patriotism of 
the two national unions was national, and did not represent approval of the 
tsarist regime. The government naturally wanted to believe that the fervour 
in support of Russia’s troops represented a real change in wider political 
82  Russkoe slovo, 21 September 1914, p. 5.
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attitudes, but its own discussions about the activities of the two unions 
indicated that it immediately saw these public organizations as presenting 
a threat to the power of the regime. For the men who established the two 
unions, the events of August and September 1914 served to reinforce their 
view of the government. They drew a distinction between commitment 
to Russia’s national struggle in war and support for the government. The 
catastrophic way in which the regime dealt with the men who had been 
wounded in the service of Russia only served to heighten the alienation of 
the two unions from the regime. The foundations for the mutual mistrust 
between government and public organizations that was to erupt into open 
conflict during 1915 were laid in summer and autumn 1914 as trains full 
of wounded, hungry, and ill-clothed men arrived in Moscow’s railway 
stations from the battlefront.
